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Contrarian Deterministic Effect: the “Hung Elections Scenario”
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A contrarian is someone who deliberately decides to oppoe the prevailing choice of others. The
Galam model of two state opinion dynamics incorporates agent updates by a single step random
grouping in which all participants adopt the opinion of their respective local majority group. The
process is repeated until a stable collective state is reached; the associated dynamics is fast. Here
we show that the introduction of contrarians may give rise to interesting dynamics generated phases
and even to a critical behavior at a contrarian concentration ac. For a < ac an ordered phase
is generated with a clear cut majority-minority splitting. By contrast when a > ac the resulting
disordered phase has no majority: agents keep shifting opinions but no symmetry breaking (i.e., the
appearance of a majority) takes place. Our results are employed to explain the outcome of the 2000
American presidential elections and that of the 2002 German parliamentary elections. Those events
are found to be inevitable. On this basis the “hung elections scenario” is predicted to become a
common occurrence in modern democracies.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Ey, 05.40.-a, 89.65.-s, 89.75.-k
In this letter, we study the effects of contrarian choices
on the dynamics of opinion forming. A contrarian is
someone who deliberately decides to oppose the prevail-
ing choice of others whatever this choice is [1]. Contrar-
ian strategy is becoming a growing new trend of modern
democracies most studied in finance [1,2].
The Galam model of two state opinion dynamics in-
corporates agent updates by a series of single steps. In
each step random groups are formed in which all partici-
pants adopt the opinion of their respective local majority
group [3–5]. The process is repeated until a stable col-
lective state is reached. The associated dynamics is fast
and leads to a total polarization along either one of the
two competing states A and B. The direction of the opin-
ion flow is monitored by an unstable separator at some
critical density pc of agent supporting the A opinion.
In the case of odd size groups, pc =
1
2 . By contrast
even sizes make pc 6= 12 . The corresponding asymmetry
in the dynamics of respectively opinion A and B arises
from the existing of local collective doubts at a tie. The
unstable separator may then be simultaneously at a value
of 23% for one state and at 77% for the other [4]. Large
size group accelerates reaching the final state with a dras-
tic reduction in the number of required updates. In the
limit of a single grouping which includes the entire pop-
ulation one update is enough to complete the full polar-
ization. Recently a generalization to any distribution of
group sizes was achieved yielding a very rich and complex
phase diagram [3]. The model was subsequently applied
to rumor phenomena [6].
Earlier version of this approach is found in the study
of voting in democratic hierarchical systems [5]. There,
groups of agents vote for a representative to the higher
level using a local majority rule. In the mean field limit,
going up the hierarchy turns out to be exactly identical to
an opinion forming process in terms of equations and dy-
namics. Instead of voting, agents update their opinions.
The probability of electing an A representative at some
hierarchy level n is equal to the proportion of A opinions
after n updates [5,4]. Recent studies by Krapivsky and
Redner further explored the dynamical properties of the
Galam model, restricted to one group of size 3 [7].
This work contributes to the now growing field of ap-
plications of Statistical Physics to social and political be-
haviors [8–15]. First denoted “Sociophysics” in a found-
ing paper [8] we extend the label to “Global Physics”. At
this stage it is worth stressing we are not aiming at an
exact description of the real social and political life, but
rather, doing some crude approximations, to enlighten
essential features of an otherwise very complex and mul-
tiple phenomena.
Here, the dynamics of Contrarian behavior is studied
using the Galam model of two state opinion dynamics
restricted to odd sizes. Introduction of contrarians at a
low density a is found to unfold the total polarization dy-
namics. The corresponding fully ordered state with one
unique opinion becomes mixed with a stable majority-
minority splitting. But the symmetry breaking is pre-
served with a clear cut majority along the initial global
majority. The unstable separator is also left unchanged
at pc =
1
2 .
However, contrarians are found to give rise to a crit-
ical behavior at a contrarian concentration ac. When
a > ac a new disordered stable phase with no majority
appears. There agents keep shifting opinions but no sym-
metry breaking (i.e., the appearance of a majority) takes
place. Contrarians have turned the unstable separator pc
into the unique stable attractor of the dynamics. Opin-
ion flows ahve been reversed. The value of ac depends on
the size distribution of update groups.
Our results are employed to explain the outcome of
the 2000 American presidential elections and that of the
1
2002 German parliamentary elections. Those events are
found to be inevitable. On this basis the “hung elections
scenario” is predicted to become a common occurrence
in modern democracies.
We start with a very simple model of opinion forming
[5,3]. Considering an ideal society before a major elec-
tion, people start discussing the issue during the election
campaign. Groups are formed randomly in which all par-
ticipants adopt the local majoirity state. Focusing first
on the group size 3, an initial 2 A (B) with one B (A)
ends up with 3 A (B). To follow the time evolution of
the vote intentions we need an estimate of the numbers
of respective vote intentions N+(t) for A and N+(t) for
B at some time t from a N person population. It can be
evaluated using polls. Each person is assumed to have
an opinion with N+(t) +N−(t) = N . Corresponding in-
dividual probabilities to a vote intention in favor of A or
B writes,
p±(t) ≡ N±(t)
N
, (1)
with,
p+(t) + p−(t) = 1. (2)
Accordingly, one cycle of local opinion updates via three
persons grouping leads to a new distribution of vote in-
tention as,
p+(t+ 1) = p+(t)
3 + 3p+(t)
2p−(t), (3)
where p+(t + 1) > p+(t) if p+(t + 1) >
1
2 and p+(t +
1) < p+(t) if p+(t + 1) <
1
2 . Indeed from Eq. (2) vote
intention p+(t) flows monotonically toward either one of
two stable point attractors at P+A = 1 and P+B = 0.
An unstable point separator attractor is located at pc =
1
2 . It separates the two basins of attraction associated
respectively to the point attractors.
During an election campaign people go trough sev-
eral successive different local discussions. To follow
the associated vote intention evolution we iterate Eq.
(2). A number of m discussion cycles gives the series
p+(t + 1), p+(t + 2)...p+(t + m). For instance start-
ing at p+(t) = 0.45 leads successively after 5 intention
updates to the series p+(t + 1) = 0.43, p+(t + 2) =
0.39, p+(t+ 3) = 0.34, p+(t+ 4) = 0.26, p+(t+ 5) = 0.17
with a continuous decline in A vote intentions. Adding
3 more cycles would result in zero A vote intention with
p+(t + 6) = 0.08, p+(t + 7) = 0.02andp+(t + 8) = 0.00.
Given any initial intention vote distribution, the random
local opinion update leads toward a total polarization of
the collective opinion. Individual and collective opinions
stabilize simultaneously along the same and unique vote
intention either A or B.
The update cycle number to reach either one of the
two stable attractors can be evaluated from Eq. (2). It
depends on the distance of the initial densities from the
unstable point attractor. An analytic formula is derived
below (see Eq. 6). However, every update cycle takes
some time length, which may correspond in real terms
to some number of days. Therefore, in practical terms
the required time to eventually complete the polarization
process is much larger than the campaign duration, thus
preventing it to occur. Accordingly, associate elections
never take place at the stable attractors. From above
example at p+(t) = 0.45 , two cycles yield a result of
39% in favor of A and 61% in favor of B. One additional
update cycle makes 34% in favor of A and 66% in favor
of B.
At this stage we are in a position to insert in the model
the existence of contrarians. A contrarian is defined as
follows [1]. Once a local group reaches a consensus driven
by the majority rule, there exists some people, which once
they left the group, shift to the opposite vote intention.
The shift is independent of the choice itself. Setting con-
trarian choices at a density a with 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 , the density
of A opinion given by Eq. (2) becomes,
p+(t+ 1) = (1 − a)[p+(t)3 + 3p+(t)2p−(t)] (4)
+a[p−(t)
3 + 3p−(t)
2p+(t)],
where first term corresponds to the regular update pro-
cess and second term to contrarian contribution from lo-
cal groups where the local majority was in favor of B.
From Eq. (4), the effect of low-density contrarian choices
is readily seen as illustrated in Figure (1) in the case
a = 0.10, i.e., with 10% contrarian choices as compared
to the pure case a = 0.
FIG. 1. Equation (4) with P+(t + 1) as function of P+(t)
at respectively a = 0 and a = 0.10. In the second case the
two stable point attractors have moved from total polarization
towards coexistence of mixed vote intentions with a clear cut
majority-minority splitting.
P t+ +( )1
    a=0.10
P t+ +( )1
       a=0
2
Main effects are twofold. First both stable point at-
tractors are shift toward coexistence vote intention val-
ues. Total polarization is averted with,
P+A(B) =
(2a− 1)±√12a2 − 8a+ 1
2(2a− 1) , (5)
which are defined only in the range a ≤ 16 . For instance a
value of a = 0.10 yields P+A = 0.85 and P+B = 0.15. At
P+A = 0.85 exists a stable coexistence of vote intentions
at respectively 0.85 in A favor with 0.15 in B favor. The
reverse holds at P+B = 0.15. At contrast contrarian
choices keep unchanged the unstable point separator at
1
2 .
The second effect from contrarian choices is an increase
in the number of cycle updates in reaching the stable at-
tractors. For instance starting as above at p+(t) = 0.45
with a = 0.10 leads now to the series p+(t + 1) =
0.44, p+(t + 2) = 0.43, p+(t + 3) = 0.42, p+(t + 4) =
0.40, p+(t+5) = 0.38. Additional 12 updates are required
to reach the stable attractor at 0.15. All cycles score to
17 against only 8 without contrarian choices. A vote at
two update cycles from above same example would give
a voting result of 43% in favor of A and 57% in favor of
B instead of respectively 39% and 61% at a = 0.
An approximate formula can be derived from Eq. (4)
to evaluate the update cycle number required to reach
either one of the two stable attractors. It writes,
n ≃ 1
ln[ 32 (2a− 1)]
ln[
pc − PS
pc − p+(t) ] +
1.85
(2a− 1)5.2 , (6)
where last term is a fitting correction. PS = P+B if
p+(t) < pc while PS = P+A when p+(t) > pc. The
number of cycles being an integer, its value is obtained
from Eq. (6) rounding to an integer. At a = 0, i.e., no
contrarian choices, n is always a small number as shown
in Figure (2). Eq. (6) gives 8 at an initial value p+(t) =
0.45 and 4 at p+(t) = 0.30, which are the exact values
obtained by successive iterations from Eq. (3). At a =
0.10 we found also the exact values of 17 and 9 as from
Eq. (4).
FIG. 2. Approximate number of cycles of vote intention
updates to reach a total polarization of opinion as function of
an initial support P+(t).
a=0
a=0.10
Both Eq. (6) and Figure (2) show explicitly the con-
trarian choice drastic effect in increasing the number of
required levels to reach the stable point attractors. That
means much longer real time. In practical terms it im-
plies a quasi-stable coexistence of both vote intentions
not too far from fifty percent but yet with a clear-cut
majority in one direction, which is determined by the
initial majority.
However contrarian choices may lead to a radical qual-
itative change in the whole vote intention dynamics. Eq.
(5) shows that at a density of a = 16 ≃ 0.17 , contrarian
choices make both point attractors to merge simultane-
ously at the unstable point separator pc =
1
2 turning it
to a stable point attractor. Consequences on the vote
intention dynamics are drastic. The flow direction is re-
versed making any initial densities to converge toward a
perfect equality between vote intention for A and B. In
physical terms, contrarians produce a phase transition
from a majority-minority phase into a fifty percent bal-
ance phase with no majority-minority splitting. In the
ordered phase elections always yield a clear-cut majority.
At contrast in the disordered phase elections lead to a
random outcome driven by statistical fluctuations. An
illustration is shown in Figure (3) for 20% of contrarians.
FIG. 3. P+(t + 1) as function of P+(t) at a = 0 and
a = 0.20. In the first case the vote intention flows away
from the unstable point attractor at 1
2
toward either one of
the stable point attractors at zero or one. In the second case,
contrarian choices have reversed the flow directions making
any initial densities to flow toward 1
2
, the now stable and
unique point attractor.
a=0
a=0.20
In real social life people don’t meet only by group of 3.
However, generalizing above approach to larger sizes is
straightforward and does not change the qualitative fea-
ture of the model. Dynamics reversal driven by contrari-
ans towards the disorder phase with no majority-minority
3
splitting is preserved. The main effect is an increase in
the value of the contrarian critical density at which the
phase transition occurs. In the case of an odd size k, Eq.
(4) becomes,
p+(t+ 1) = (2a− 1)
k∑
i= k+1
2
Cikp+(t)
ip−(t)
(k−i) + a, (7)
where Ci
k
≡ k!(k−i)!i! . The instrumental parameter in
determining the flow direction and the associate phase
transition is the eigenvalue at the point attractor pc =
1
2 .
It is given by,
λ = (2a− 1)
[
1
2
]k−1 k∑
i= k+1
2
(2i− k)Cik. (8)
The range λ > 1 determines an unstable point attrac-
tor with an ordered phase characterized by the existence
of a majority-minority splitting. At contrast, λ < 1
makes the point attractor stable. The case λ = 1 deter-
mines the critical value of the contrarian choice density
ac at which the phase transition occurs. From Eq. (8),
we get,
ac =
1
2

1−

(1
2
)k−1
k∑
i= k+1
2
(2i− k)Cik


−1

 . (9)
In the case k = 3 we recover the above result a = 16 ≃
0.17. From Eq. (9) it is seen that ac → 12 , k → +∞ with
0.33 at k = 5 and 0.30 at k = 9.
We have presented a simple model to study the effect of
contrarian choices on opinion forming. At low densities a
the opinion dynamics leads to a mixed phase with a clear
cut majority-minority splitting. However, beyond some
critical density ac, contrarians make all the attractors to
merge at the separator pc. It becomes the unique attrac-
tor of the opinion dynamics. When a > ac vote intentions
flow deterministically with time towards an exact equal-
ity between A and B opinions. In this new disordered
stable phase no majority appears. Agents keep shifting
opinions but no symmetry breaking (i.e., the appearance
of a majority) takes place. There an election would result
in effect in a random winner due to statistical fluctua-
tions. The value of ac depends on the size distribution of
update groups.
Accordingly, our results shed a totally new light on re-
cent elections in America (2000) and Germany (2002). It
suggests those “hung elections” were not chance driven.
On the opposite, they are a deterministic outcome of con-
trarians. As a consequence, since contrarian thinking is
becoming a growing trend of modern societies, the sub-
sequent “hanging chad elections” syndrome is predicted
to become both inevitable and of a common occurrence.
While finalizing this manuscript we have notice Ref.
[16] by Mobilia and Redner in which a phase transition
in a disordered opinion phase is also obtained via an inter-
esting extension of Galam model (restricted to one group
of size 3) which combines locally majority and minority
rules. However the microscopic rules used as well as the
socio-political interpretation and the the critical values
are different from those of the present work.
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